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GOD'S ABILITY TO WILL MORAL EVIL
Robert F. Brown

Pike, Reichenbach, and others, correctly hold that a God whose very nature
prevents him from doing evil cannot properly be regarded as morally good.
But they fail to show just how God's moral goodness can be effectively
independent of his ontological goodness, how God can be "significantly free"
and so be morally praiseworthy. I argue that their contention calls for a
greater modification of classical theism than they realize, i.e., for abandoning
the traditional subordination of God's will to God's (supposedly necessary)
goodness. I explore a way of reconceiving the relation of God's will to his
nature, so that he actually can be morally praiseworthy, free either to obey
or to violate his own moral law.

Nelson Pike, Bruce Reichenbach, and others have argued that classical Christian theism holds an inadequate view of God's goodness in relation to God's
freedom and power to do what is morally evil.) The New Testament Epistle
of James, verse 13, states that "God cannot be tempted by evil"; the Church
Fathers elaborated this theme as the doctrine of divine impeccability. On this
foundation arose the classical view that God lacks the ability or creative
power to bring about any morally reprehensible state of affairs. Pike argues
that a God who could not do evil also could not be morally good, for refraining from doing evil is morally praiseworthy only because the one who refrains
is able to do evil. On a religiously adequate notion of divine goodness, God
can do moral evil but refrains, or freely chooses not to do it.
Pike and Reichenbach have been subjected to thoughtful criticism. 2 I shall
take brief note of such criticism, although it is not my main purpose to defend
them against it. I believe their general approach (hereafter often referred to
as "Pike's position") is viable, but not in its present form and without elaboration of its fuller implications for our conception of God's nature and will.
My chosen task here is not so much to defend Pike's position as it is to extend it.
Pike and his supporters do not explain how to conceive of God as having
the freedom to will, and the power to carry out, moral evil. After examining
their views and a bit of the criticism, I shall explain why the traditional
doctrine of God needs more extensive modification than they apparently
realize. To make their conception of God's moral goodness feasible, they also
need to revise the classical conception of God's will in relation to the conFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 8 No.1 January 1991
All rights reserved.

3

4

Faith and Philosophy

ceptions of God's immutability and of his own goodness, and to the goodness
of other things that God wills. 3 The argument of this paper shall, however,
try as much as possible to remain within the general framework of classical
theism rather than resorting outright to some modern position, such as process
metaphysics or existentialism, that almost completely discards that tradition.
Retained, among others, are the traditional assumptions that whatever God
wills God wills efficaciously,4 and that God's causality operates not only
directly but also indirectly, through the use of creatures as intermediate or
proximate causes of the effects God wills to bring about. Nevertheless, the
statement that "God can will what is morally evil" here refers not to God's
permitting, or sustaining by creative power, the evil acts freely chosen by
creatures; it refers instead to God's freedom directly to will, and thereby
initiate, moral evil himself.
I. Omnipotence and the Ability to Will Moral Evil

Pike directs attention to an apparent conflict in the classical tradition between two divine attributes:
1. Omnipotence: God can bring about any state of affairs that is consistently
describable, i.e., that is free of logical contradiction; as Aquinas says, God
can do "whatever is possible absolutely" (ST!, Q25, A3).

2. Perfect goodness: God cannot sin, i.e., God cannot act in a morally reprehensible way (Aquinas, ST!, Q19, A9).

Their conjunction suggests that God both could and could not bring about
certain consistently describable events. Pike's example is the avoidable and
protracted dying from starvation of an innocent child, where its suffering and
death has no value (as edification, punishment, etc.) for it or for anyone else.
An omnipotent deity could surely bring about such a morally reprehensible
event, whereas a perfectly good one could not (Pike, pp. 209-10).
How does classical theism solve this logical difficulty? Anselm, in discussing the possibility of God's being corrupted or telling lies, writes:
... when someone is said to have the 'power' of doing or suffering something
which is not to his advantage or which he ought not to do, then by 'power'
here we mean 'impotence,' for the more he has this 'power,' the more adversity and perversity have power over him and the more is he powerless against
them. 5

Aquinas agrees, for doing moral evil is "falling short of a perfect action," which
is a defect incompatible with omnipotence (ST!, Q25, A3, reply to obj. 2).
Pike's counter argument is that being morally weak ("falling short in action") is logically compatible with being able to bring about any consistently
describable state; that is, there is no logical or conceptual difficulty in the
idea of a diabolical omnipotent being (Pike, p. 210). To this a Platonist might
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retort that the perfect instances of all ontological perfections are inseparable
and so must coincide in one being. From this ontological (but not logical)
principle it would follow that an omnipotent being must also be perfectly
good, and vice versa. Pike does not consider this option. Nevertheless, that
general Platonic principle cannot sustain the specific contention that because
God is omnipotent God lacks the ability freely to do moral evil. As we shall
see shortly, it is dubious first to allow an ontological notion of goodness to
control the meaning of omnipotence (as does Anselm), and from that privileged meaning of omnipotence then to restrict the scope of God's free will
with regard to moral goodness. Subordination of the meaning of one perfection to that of another cries out for further justification, but the theological
Platonist does not provide it.
It is important to note that, the title of his paper notwithstanding, Pike is
not mainly concerned with the doctrine of omnipotence per se, nor does his
discussion presuppose a highly technical or contentious conception of omnipotence. He is mainly concerned with a conception of moral freedom, and
that is my main concern as well. Pike attacks a special Anselmian-Thomistic
qualification imposed upon omnipotence that has the effect of curtailing
God's moral freedom. His contention that an omnipotent God can bring about
any consistently describable state amounts to rephrasing Thomas ("God can
do all that is possible absolutely") minus the qualification ("except to will
moral evil or to be morally evil"). But Pike's attack on the Anse1mian-Thomistic view that omnipotence entails divine inability to will moral evil does
not actually arise from a primary concern with omnipotence; it is not simply
the contrary view that omnipotence entails the ability to sin. To argue in that
way would require a full-dress analysis of omnipotence, far beyond what Pike
provides. In drawing out the implications of Pike's position, I do not argue
from a supposed logical incompatibility of divine impeccability with omnipotence; the pivotal attribute for the argument is not divine omnipotence but
divine will. A divine ability to will moral evil is to be envisaged and defended
as the consequence of a certain freedom of the divine will (which must, to
be sure, be coupled with power sufficient to effect whatever it wills).
Consider the case of a strong man with the muscular power sufficient to
lift a certain heavy object, but who has been hypnotized so that he could not
want, or intend, to lift it. In one sense he has the ability to lift it, but in another
he does not. Pike seems to be thinking of a divine ability somewhat analogous
to both these senses taken together. He thinks that if God's acts are to count
as morally good, then God must be without the Anselmian counterpart to the
strong man's hypnotic block, that is, he must be genuinely free in a moral
sense; he must not be prevented, by a necessary goodness of his own nature,
from willing or intending certain kinds of acts.6
A different possibility (mentioned in passing by Aquinas, in STl, Q25, A3,
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reply to obj. 2) is that God can do what seems evil to us but is not really evil.
However, Pike declares that it is illegitimate to shift the meaning of "evil"
or of "morally reprehensible" just to protect one's flank philosophically,
when God rather than a creature is said to be the actor. Aquinas himself
teaches the "analogy of being," according to which God's own being contains
to an eminent degree the same perfections present to a lesser degree in
creatures (ST!, Q4, AA2-3). Accordingly, for Thomas God's moral goodness
cannot really be different from ours in kind rather than just in degree (if we
ignore the differences in means suitable to immaterial beings and material
beings respectively, for carrying out their actions). Pike holds that the standard for measuring God's moral goodness cannot be different from the standard for measuring ours; the contrast is just that God regularly meets that
standard (of truthfulness, justice, etc.) and we do not. On Thomistic grounds,
moreover, we can be said to possess from revelation and natural reason a
knowledge on the whole reliable as to what that standard is. According to
Pike, therefore, if God were to act in a way that we would unhesitatingly call
morally evil were a human agent the actor instead (such as by causing the
death by starvation of an innocent child, as in the example above), it would
be an evasion on our part to say that in this instance that act cannot be morally
evil, solely for the reason that it is God who is doing it. OUT moral conceptions
and discourse should not be so elastic as that. 7
Pike next introduces three distinct meanings of the statement "God cannot
sin," i.e., cannot do something morally reprehensible:
1. A logical impossibility:

~If X sins, then X cannot qualify as God." This
meaning treats ~God" as a title rather than as a common noun or a proper
name, and it stipulates one qualification for bearing this title. It says
nothing about limits on the power of X, but only says that if X were to
sin then X would forfeit entitlement to be God. 8

2. A material concept: ~God lacks the creative power to sin." A being materially incapable of sinning cannot be morally good, since it lacks the
power to be morally evil; nor can it be omnipotent, except on the mistaken
view of Anselm and Aquinas.
3. A morally praiseworthy status: ~God cannot bring himself to sin." This
means that God is strongly disposed not to act in a morally reprehensible
way, but is not actually prevented from doing so, not even by his own
nature.

The religious believer is fully confident that God will freely choose to maintain a good character in the future. Nevertheless this third meaning of "God
cannot sin" is logically compatible with the first one only, not with the
second. According to Pike, the error of Anselm and Aquinas lies in confusing
the second meaning with the third, in representing "unable to sin" as the
correct meaning of "choosing not to sin"; it further lies in associating "unable
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to sin" with omnipotence. Thus they mistakenly suppose that omnipotence
and moral perfection entail a material inability or lack of creative power to
do moral evil (Pike, p. 216).
These then are Pike's conclusions:
1. There is no logical connection between perfect moral goodness and om-

nipotence.
2. God has the creative power to do what is morally reprehensible, but freely
chooses not to. To say that "God cannot bring himself to sin" is simply to
attribute to God a certain character seen in the consistent way that God
exercises free choice.

In this connection we might note William J. Wainwright's observations about
one version of the argument that God cannot sin, an argument based at least
in part on the assumption that" ... being God is an essential attribute of the
being who is God ... "9 Wainwright remarks (p. 249) that "classical theism
would, I think, reject the notion that it is merely a contingent fact that the
being who is God, is God ... ," and he also observes that from the premiss that
it is necessarily true that a being who is God does not sin, "it follows that
classical theism is committed to the view that God is unable to sin" in the
strong sense-it is a logical or a causal (Le., material) impossibility. But
Wainwright adds (p. 249):
Whether classical theism needs to assert the first premiss ['It is necessarily
true that the being who is God, is God'] is another question. It is possible
that the first premiss can be rejected without in any other way seriously
modifying the theistic position.

Pike clearly rejects that premiss. His rejection can be expressed in the form
of a third conclusion.
3. Perfect moral goodness may in the eyes of religious believers be logically
connected with "being God," but it is only contingently connected with
"the being who is God."

To accept these three conclusions evidently would require a significant modification of the framework of classical theism, though not its wholesale rejection.

II. Ontological and Moral Goodness Distinguished
Reichenbach's criticism of Aquinas further illumines the difficulty regarding God's goodness. He identifies two distinct senses in which God is said
to be good. The first expresses an ontological conception: "God is good
because of his nature." Aquinas bases this conception upon two points:
1. God alone is pure act (God's essence is to exist); thus God alone has the

perfection of self-sufficiency (ST!, Q3, A4).
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2. God is the good at which all things aim (the final cause of all things); thus
God alone is his own end (STl, Q5, A4, and Q6, AI).

Conceived in this way, God's goodness and God's being are coextensive.
Hence God is said to be good essentially and necessarily. According to
Aquinas, God wills his own goodness necessarily, and wills other things only
as ordered to his own goodness (ST!, Q19, A3). Since God's transient acts,
or acts ad extra, must accord with his own necessarily good nature, they must
be good; their goodness is a necessary consequence of God's own ontological
structure. 10
The second sense expresses a moral conception: "God does, and is disposed
to do, what is good." Reichenbach agrees with Pike that for this moral conception to be meaningful, "God cannot do evil" must not have logical or
ontological force. God's refraining from moral evil must be due to God's
freely maintained character and not to lack of power or opportunity.
Reichenbach argues that the ontological conception cannot undergird the
moral conception because it cannot satisfy at least one of the necessary
conditions for an act to count as morally good. Aquinas insists that God is
free to act or not to act in various ways; for example, God does not have to
create a world and, if he does, it does not have to be the best of all possible
worlds. But his God is not significantly free in Alvin Plantinga's sense.
Plantinga defines an action as " ... morally significant, for a given person at
a given time, if it would be wrong for him to perform the action then but
right to refrain, or vice versa"; he adds that a person is significantly free when
he or she is free to do or not to do some morally significant actionY For
Reichenbach, significant freedom of the actor is a necessary condition for an
act to count as morally good, and this is a condition that cannot be satisfied
if it is logically or ontologically l2 impossible for that actor to do moral evil
(pp. 55-57). On Aquinas's account, God's acts cannot be significantly free,
i.e., free qua the rightness of the acts. Reichenbach therefore says that we
cannot appropriately call this God "good" in the moral sense (p. 59).
Reichenbach concludes that for Aquinas divine goodness is exclusively ontological, and not moral. It only seems moral because of an equivocation
between the two senses of "good."
One likely objection is that this appeal to significant freedom amounts to
a substitution of a libertarian notion of freedom as the uncaused or unconstrained power of self-determination where alternatives are available to be
chosen, in place of a very different notion held by classical theists. Augustine,
Anselm, Aquinas, et ai., depict the highest sort of freedom (that possessed
by God, the good angels, and the blessed in heaven) as an utter inability to
sin. This is not just a contingent freedom from being actually sinful, but a
freedom from the possibility of ever being sinful (again, in the human case),
an ontological immunity either possessed by nature (in the case of God) or
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conferred by grace (upon good angels and blessed humans). On this view
God's ontological goodness stands as an ideal toward which creatures in their
efforts at moral goodness should aspire and strive. Their striving is morally
praiseworthy but their ideal, God's own ontological goodness, is not. But that
is no defect in God, whose moral praiseworthiness consists only in his freely
willed acts of grace or supererogation. A fair response is that this objection is
correct, that Pike's position requires that such a substitution be made. With that
acknowledged-Pike and Reichenbach could be more forthright about the
substitution and could give a fuller defense of the libertarian option-the issue
is then the relative merits of the two rival conceptions of divine freedom.
It is a large task to defend the general superiority of a libertarian notion of
freedom as applied to God's own goodness and will, one that lies beyond the
scope of this paper, as already stated. 13 Here I shall simply comment on one
facet, the use of the term "morally praiseworthy." To say, as some defenders
of classical theism do, that God need not be morally praiseworthy for the
goodness of his willing (aside from acts of grace or supererogation) is to be
insufficiently attentive to ordinary religious beliefs. To praise God for the
way his guiding hand routinely affects human affairs is not, to the believer,
like our (non-moral) admiration of the elephant for its strength, of the bee
for its diligence, or even of Miss America Pageant contestants for their natural
beauty. It is rather more like praising Jane Doe for the honest way in which
she conducts her law practice. To "praise" without thereby giving credit for
choices made and effort exerted, without imputing freedom and responsibility
to the one praised, hardly seems to capture the main sense of the term as we
use it in religious and other contexts. Not all such praise need be for moral
acts. One could give due credit by praising an aesthetic accomplishment, for
example, of a pianist who chooses to practice and study over many years in
order to make a fine performance possible. It seems a bit odd to suggest that
religious believers don't intend to give credit and impute responsibility to
God in a comparable way for the things God does that are analogous to the
moral acts of human beings, odd to deny that God is a moral actor (and so
could do otherwise than he does). One way around this would be to declare
arbitrarily that all divine acts of moral significance must be in fact supererogatory, so that God's omitting to perform them would not be morally
wrong. That extreme stance would, I think, be unfaithful to the intention of
most people's actual religious beliefs.
We have seen then that, on the views of Pike and Reichenbach, we cannot
deduce the moral goodness of God's acts from God's nature as a given, and
therefore God must be able to will moral evil. But someone favoring Pike's
approach cannot rest content at this point. The relation between God's willing
and God's being requires further scrutiny; we must take a still closer look at
Aquinas.
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III. The Deeper Problem
Christian Platonism and Aristotelianism not only mistakenly derive a material inability to do moral evil from the attribute of omnipotence (as Pike
holds), and equivocate between ontological and moral senses of "good" (as
Reichenbach holds). These philosophies also are burdened with a deficient
view of will, one that leads to a religiously unsatisfactory conception of the
relation of God's will to God's being and goodness. 14
The difficulty becomes clear when we examine a progression of seven
points found in Aquinas (Sn, Q19: "Will in God"), the first four of which
are:
1. The objective of God's will is his own goodness (AI, reply to obj. 3).

2. God wills his own goodness with absolute necessity (A3).
3. God wills other things insofar as they have his own goodness as their end
(A3).
4. "To be good" and "to be desirable" have the same signification (A9; cf.
Q5, Ai).

As we have seen, because divine goodness alone is perfectly desirable, God
necessarily wills (read: "ratifies," not "originates") his own goodness, and
freely wills other things only in such a way as to be ordered to his own
goodness. IS From the Thomistic principle that all divine attributes are one in
the unity of the divine essence (Sn, Q13, A12, reply), we might expect a
reciprocity between God's goodness and God's will; instead we find an asymmetrical relation. On the one hand, the perfect desirability of God's goodness
makes it impossible for God to will otherwise than harmoniously with it. On
the other hand, however, God himself is not good because of willing his own
goodness, for God's nature cannot be other than it is. Its perfect desirability
makes God's goodness a final cause ineluctably drawing God's will to it;
divine goodness determines divine will, and not vice versa. This way of
thinking scarcely yields an acceptable notion of God's will as free, in the
sense Pike and Reichenbach require for God's actions to count as morally
praiseworthy.
In his transient acts God cannot command or act contrary to his own
goodness, i.e., God is not free to will in a morally evil or reprehensible
fashion, in the way that creatures can. Thus Aquinas continues (again, in sn,
Q19, A9):
5. An appetitive power can directly seek only what has ontological goodness,
Le., being and inherent desirability. Thus no evil can be directly wanted
by natural appetite, or by the intelligent appetite that is will.
6. Creatures can will moral evil indirectly, concomitantly to their direct
willing of some good lesser than they ought to will.
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7. God can will (i.e., permit, and create the necessary conditions for,) physical evil or suffering for the sake of some greater good to which it is
attached, but God cannot will moral evil at all, for God cannot upset the
ordering of all things to the divine goodness.

Thus the supremely desirable ontological goodness of God's nature constrains God's will as appetitive power, so that in his transient acts God is
materially incapable of willing contrary to that goodness, i.e., is materially
incapable of willing moral evil.
This non-reciprocal relation between God's good being and God's will is
deeply embedded in the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical heritage that
Aquinas and other classical theists build upon. Pike and Reichenbach correctly point out the main symptom of this deficiency as it affects the doctrine
of God. Theirs is just a cosmetic remedy that conceals a deeper problem,
however, if they simply affirm that God, although ontologically good himself,
is in his transient acts free to will in a morally significant sense, and leave it
at that. For divine freedom to be actually moral, God must be self-determining
in a way that classical notions of goodness as inherent desirability, and of
will as appetitive, are incapable of expressing. A truly voluntaristic or libertarian conception of God's will is needed to carry through the program of
Pike and Reichenbach consistently.

IV. One Direction to Take
The needed conception can be found in a minority viewpoint within classical theism itself. There is the curiously hybrid thought of Augustine, a
Platonist when it comes to the doctrine of God, but also the chief architect
of the theological conception of human free will. To him we owe the famous
declaration that:
... unless the movement of the will towards this or that object is voluntary
and within our power, a man would not be praiseworthy when he turns to the
higher object nor blameworthy when he turns to lower objects, using his will
like a hinge. 16

This imprecise but suggestive comparison of the human will to a hinge that
can turn itself either way, toward God or away from God, underlies our basic
notions of human moral praiseworthiness and of sinfulness.
Can we represent God's willing in a comparable way, even though Augustine himself did not? I believe Pike's position should also directly oppose the
classical assumption that willing has for its object only what has being and
thus ontological goodness, because that restrictive assumption leads to the
subordination of God's creative and originative will to God's own being. It
should also oppose the collateral assumption that objects of desire determine
the will, not just influence it, and that when we don't pursue a particular
desired object it is because another, even more desirable, object is attracting
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us instead. Augustine speaks as if human beings will what they most desire
or love because the object's desirability draws them to it. A consistent voluntarist should instead say that, in their willing, people can at least sometimes
freely choose what kinds of things they desire or love, that they can choose
their own basic dispositions, that at its root their willing has no determining
cause but the willing itself. This libertarian thesis calls for qualification in
the face of such factors as biological heredity, body chemistry, and environmental influences, which seem to circumscribe human freedom severely, at
least for some individuals. But the case of God has no counterpart to this; a
truly free God has no heredity or body chemistry, and no environment God
might choose to create could circumscribe his freedom so as to make him
materially incapable of willing moral evil. No factor of these kinds prevents
us from attributing to God a will like a self-moving hinge, one that can turn
away from, Le., will incompatibly with, his own ontologically good being.
A bolder and perhaps reckless declaration appears in Luther's Bondage of
the Will, in his discussion of God's hardening of pharaoh's heart, and of
God's allowing Adam to fall:
God is he for whose will no cause or ground may be laid down as its rule
and standard; for nothing is on a level with it or above it, but it is itself the
rule for all things. If any rule or standard, cause or ground, existed for it, it
could no longer be the will of God. What God wills is not right because he
ought, or was bound, so to will; on the contrary, what takes place must be
right, because he so wills it. Causes and grounds are laid down for the will
of the creature, but not for the will of the creator-unless you set another
creator over him!17

Pike's position need not go this far in order to give credibility to God's moral
freedom. The very norms of moral goodness need not be arbitrary for God
to be free in a morally praiseworthy sense; God just needs to have the capability to violate them. 18
How might we modify the classical view of divine will so as to exploit the
Augustinian theme without slipping into the perilous Lutheran overstatement? Let us look in more detail at two specific issues. One is the relation
of God's will to time. According to classical theism, the timelessly eternal
God wills certain events to occur in certain ways and at certain times in the
world's history. God timelessly wills rain for today and clear skies for tomorrow. Such a God could timelessly will a moral good (e.g., the sparing of
an endangered child) or a moral evil (e.g., the needlessly cruel death of an
innocent child). A timelessly eternal will does not "change its mind," even
though to a time-bound observer of its acts it might appear to do so. But
mustn't a timeless will have a fixed character or disposition, albeit freely
chosen, from which its transient acts flow in morally (or immorally) uniform
fashion? We do not at the empirical level attribute a fixed character (wholly
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good or wholly evil) to people as moral agents, and we need not attribute one
to a timeless God either.19 The only insight into God's character we have
derives from what God has done, said or promised; and a free being who
promises can break those promises. That a free and eternal God can will moral
evil means that God can timelessly choose not to be consistent regarding the
moral quality of his acts in time. So we do not necessarily have to reject the
classical view of a timeless deity for the sake of God's moral freedom. And
even if we do reject it in favor of a view of God's temporal eternity, or of
an even more radical temporality, "God cannot bring himself to do moral
evil" need only mean that we do not think God has willed moral evil in the
past, and we do not expect or fear that he will do so in the future, although
he could.
A second issue is whether God can will evil for its own sake. Willing evil
need not be the consequence of inappropriately willing a lesser good than
one ought to will, because willing is not necessarily an appetitive act directed
toward a desirable object. Disobedience of a moral law might be willed not
for the sake of some other and lesser ontological good. A truly free agent can
simply choose to disobey for no reason at all apart from the choosing itself;
"perversity" is not a reason for deliberately willing evilly, but is just what
we call doing so without a reason. (The overly intellectualistic tradition of
classical theism, with its underdeveloped notion of will, cannot account for
the event in which a person freely, deliberately, and irrationally wills moral
evil just because he or she chooses to, and not because of being in the grip
of bodily passions or the like.) This bold statement presupposes a basically
Kantian, rather than Platonic-Aristotelian, view of human will (and, by extension, of divine will). A Kantian will freely and responsibly chooses the
maxims in accord with which it then executes its particular choices, or further
particular acts of will. Such a will is free to choose other maxims than the
ones currently guiding it, Le., it is free to change its basic cast from good to
evil or vice versa. I have of course no proD/that this view of will is the correct
one for all free beings and contexts, although I believe that it is; nor have I
proof that there truly is akrasia understood as irrational choice of some evil
freely made after fuIl deliberation, although I believe that there is. What I do
contend is that Pike's position needs a view of the divine will along these
lines if it is to carry through fully with its critique of traditional theism.
A necessarily good God of the Thomistic sort is a God with scarcely any
"will" at all in a morally relevant sense of the term. A truly free God,
however, could will a moral evil incompatible with the very moral law that
the same God generally commands and himself obeys on other occasions. If
he did that, it would seem silly to say (in Aristotelian language) that God
appetitively disobeys his own law for the sake of some other and lesser good.
Instead we should simply say that for this occasion God wills differently than
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he usually does, and for that there is no cause other than God's free choice
itself. A truly free God who can will irrationally is religiously preferable to
a God who is not morally free and hence not truly moral at all.

V. What Kind of God? What Kind of Good?
The sort of God to be affirmed by a further development of Pike's position
is one whose free will is at least coequal with his own ontologically good
being. The requirement of a genuinely independent will seems to call for a
bipolar deity. One model of such a deity appears in Schelling's essays, Of
Human Freedom (1809) and The Ages of the World (1811-1815).20 Despite
its idiosyncrasies, Schelling's view of a bipolar God is worth a brief look
here because it stresses divine freedom in a way that remains in lively conversation with the concerns of classical theism. It may serve to push Pike's
position further in the direction it needs to develop.
The being of Schelling's God couldn't be other than it is, in the sense of
having different attributes or ontological perfections. Yet it could "not be at
all" if God didn't freely and timelessly will it. The fundamental elements, or
what Schelling calls the "powers," of any being whatsoever admit of only
one stable structure. Schelling's God freely wills that he have this order or
structure himself, and by doing so he gives to himself a stable being. But
God doesn't have to will it, for he could instead eternally choose to remain
simply a will and a turmoil of disorderly powers. Schelling might rephrase
Aquinas by saying that God freely wills his own being and ontological goodness, which is necessary with respect to its essence or what it is, but is
contingent with respect to its existence or actuality. This God also freely wills
a creation, in which each individual member must likewise have a measure
of ontological order and goodness if it is to exist at all, with God's own
structural perfections as its paradigms. Schelling's God is therefore not free
to create any sort of creatures whatsoever, although he is free not to create
at all. However, in his dealings with creatures once they are created, God is
free to will howsoever he wishes, is even free to will moral evil contrary to
their well-being. This God's free will is not subordinated to his own ontological goodness by some principle dictating that, for the existing creation,
he can only will other things (events affecting the creatures) in accord with
the perfect desirability or stability of his own being. One potentially worrisome feature of this type of position, however, is that it seems such a free
God could have timelessly willed certain moral laws to be other than they
actually are for our world. A radically free God might neither be bound to
have just the moral laws he does will nor, having willed them, be restrained
by a material incapacity to disobey them himself. Would that result leave us
with a fideistic stance after all, one in which whatever God wills is good by
definition, in which "morally good" means "whatever God wills"?
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Is the moral law given somehow in God's realized being, i.e., is God's own
ontological structure the basis of morality? Classical theism for the most part
thinks it is, as Reichenbach has shown in his critique of Aquinas. Alternatively, might the moral law be an independent standard, whether ontological
or of some other sort, against which the goodness of God's moral character
and specific acts of will can be measured? When Aquinas and other classical
theists speak about creation, they typically adopt the former perspective and
say that God's being simply is the standard to which his acts of will conform.
Some modem thinkers (e.g., Kantians) would find the latter perspective preferable. Indeed, it is hard to see how classical theism as well can avoid the
latter perspective when speaking of God's goodness as moral, as a character
trait. That is because it is not evidently the same thing to be a standard and
to meet a standard; and a free agent who is good in a morally praiseworthy
sense seems to be not a standard itself but one who measures up to a standard.
It seems distinctly odd to call "morally good" a God who (in Spinozistic
fashion) simply is what he is, without reference to something other than what
he simply is and has to be, whether that something might be a standard freely
decreed by him or one independent of him.
In any event, classical theism would not allow the content of "morally
good" to be arbitrary, or will-dependent, nor would it allow that that content
could have been other than it is. But suppose the moral law itself might have
been different, had a truly free God (timelessly) willed differently than he
does. "Is the good good because God wills it, or does God will it because it
is goOd?"21 To say that "God wills the good because it is good" suggests, on
one reading, that its goodness constrains God to will as he does. With a
Thomistic God who is constrained to will his own (ontological) goodness
with absolute necessity, and to will all other things (ontological and moral)
in conformity with it, the immutability and necessity of God's own being as
the sole standard of goodness is guaranteed, but at the price of depicting that
God as morally unfree, as unable in the moral sphere (except for supererogatory acts) to be, to will, or to act, in a different manner than he does. To say
instead that "the good is good because God wills it" would mean that the
good's status as standard derives not from its own intrinsic nature, but instead
from God's will and absolute power, which decree and establish it as the
good. On this latter alternative we could place more stress on moral goodness
and give full value to the conviction that God genuinely is or has free will,
is truly morally praiseworthy. But we also risk making the content of the
good arbitrary and changeable, for mightn't God have willed a different
content instead? Are we stuck with a simple choice between these two options, or can we develop the implications of Pike's position in some third
way?
If we develop those implications with no more disturbance to classical
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theism and to moral reflection than is absolutely necessary, then we might
say three things about the standard of moral goodness in relation to God.
1. The moral standard can be viewed as fixed rather than changeable, on a
weaker and non-Thomistic reading of the first alternative above-i.e., that
the good itself is the standard by which the goodness of God's particular
moral acts is to be measured.

It would not follow automatically from this principle that the fixity derives
somehow from the nature of ontological goodness per se (i.e., the factors
productive of ontological stability, whether in God or in creatures). Perhaps
it is a standard that, in Kantian fashion, is properly moral rather than ontological at its root. It also would not follow automatically that the standard
would be wholly independent of God in all respects. Perhaps God timelessly
decrees it, so that it both is unchangeable in actuality and could have been
different (had God timelessly willed a different standard instead). Both of
these issues are matters for further investigation.
2. We can conceive of God, in his willing ad extra, as free to adhere to that
standard or to violate it for any given occasion since, as standard (even
as standard timelessly wiJIed), it wouldn't causally determine God's particular acts of wiJI to conform to it.
3. God's freedom to violate the standard would be a prerequisite for God's
goodness of will or of action being a moral goodness, being morally
praiseworthy.

From these principles and from the argument of this paper, it would follow
that a morally free God can do or command moral evil not just on or for a
single occasion (e.g., command the sacrifice of Isaac), but also over an extended period. Examples of the latter sort (on the assumption that these
actions truly are commanded by God and do not just follow from human
misconceptions of God's will) might be the systematic destruction of Canaanite cities by the Hebrews, the medieval Christian crusades, and the Islamic
military jihad. According to this view, religious believers ought to concede
that a morally free deity could command such things (although of course they
need not affirm that he has in fact done so nor expect that he will), and that
his doing so would not make them morally right.
What then would it really mean to the religious believer to say that "God"
is a title that could be forfeited? Suppose the supreme creator of the universe
were to will moral evil for one or a few occasions. Suppose he truly did
command Saul to "utterly destroy" the Amalekites, "man and woman, infant
and suckling, ox and sheep, calliel and ass" (I Samuel 15:3)? Would the
believer cease on that basis to worship and obey that creator, and instead
deny that he is "God"? Would that be a realistic course? Surely we must strive
to keep our moral integrity by refusing allegiance to a devil who is utterly
evil (especially when there is a good God available to turn to instead). But
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would it make sense to refuse allegiance to a predominantly good creator
who is the only God, but who is able to (and perhaps does) freely slip into
moral evil once in a great while? Where else in such a universe would we
turn for help, for grace, for salvation?22 To ourselves?
In sum, can Pike's first meaning of "God cannot sin" be modified in such
a way that "God" remains a title but the logical incompatibility is removed,
that the necessary connection between "God" and "good" is broken? That
would require replacing "God cannot sin" in the first meaning with: "Morally,
God is vastly superior to any other being." Then we could say: "If X is not
vastly superior morally (as well as in other ways) to any other being, then X
cannot qualify as God." A friend can act in an unfriendly manner once or
twice without permanently forfeiting the title "friend." Religious believers
might allow that God could will some moral evil without thereby ceasing to
be "God." They might do well to acknowledge that God is morally free and
really could sin although they don't expect him to, and that if God did sin
(as an aberration) they would still worship him and call him "God." Is that
too high a theological and philosophical price to pay for accepting the larger
implications of Pike's argument about God's moral goodness? Perhaps not.
University of Delaware
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21. This famous question from Plato's Euthyphro lOA ("Is that which is holy loved by
the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods") was posed in the
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although it is insufficiently distinguished from it, see Charles Lewis, "Divine Goodness
and Worship Worthiness," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983),
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they may be, nor can we be barred in principle from finding, and objecting to, inconsistencies in those commands. On the one hand, however, we mustn't take the easy route of
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